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On Prohibition of Abuse of Law as a General Principle of EU Law 
RITA DE LA FERIA 
It is now more than a decade since the judgment in Halifax, and nearly two since it was referred to the CJEU by a 
UK court.1  It is hard to overstate its significance: the decision is arguably one of the most important ever delivered 
by the Court within the field of taxation, and beyond.  After many years developing the principle of prohibition of 
abuse of law, the co-constitutive process of reverberation that characterises the development of principles of EU 
law had finally reached its cognisance stage:2 the passage from dormant status to full consciousness, the moment 
of collective recognition of the existence of this principle.3  Since entering the post cognisance period there have 
been many CJEU decisions densifying the principle, and much has been written on it, and them – including in this 
Review.  Yet, whilst there seems to be unanimous agreement as regards the existence of the principle, its exact 
nature is still a contested issue.  In particular, the question that still lingers is whether the principle of prohibition of 
abuse of law should be characterised as a general principle, or as an interpretative principle. 
It is true that, in many cases the exact nature of the principle will be, from a practical perspective, irrelevant,4 as 
one of the main function of general principles is to operate as interpretative aids, and gap fillers.5  There are, 
however, many situations where the distinction is legally, and practically, relevant: beyond their role as 
interpretative aids, general principles can also act as overriding rules of law,6 they can therefore trigger contra 
legem interpretation, acting as instruments of judicial review, and apply directly at national level, in the absence of 
domestic legislation to the effect.  General principles have, therefore, all the legal functions of interpretative 
principles, as well as others – and it is the presence of those other legal functions which makes the characterisation 
of principle of prohibition of abuse of law as a general principle, or as an interpretative principle, crucial for taxation.  
An interpretative anti-avoidance principle would only be applicable in the presence of EU legislation, and would be 
limited by its wording; whilst, a general anti-avoidance principle can be applied in the absence of EU legislation, 
and act as an instrument of judicial review.  Determining the exact nature of the principle, therefore, matters. 
This Editorial presents the case in favour of characterising the principle of prohibition of abuse of law as a general 
principle of EU, arguing that not only does it display the key characteristics of such principles but that, following 
the most recent CJEU decisions, its characterisation as such is now settled case law. 
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Cussens and Others and the Danish Cases 
One of the most significant decisions on the discussion concerning the characterisation of the principle of 
prohibition of abuse of law as general or interpretative – and one which has framed much of the debate since it 
was decided in 2012 – is that in 3M Italia.7  In that case concerning the taxation of dividends, asked about the 
applicability of the principle in light of Halifax and Cadbury Schweppes, the Court stated that ‘no general principle 
exists in European Union law which might entail an obligation of the Member States to combat abusive practices 
in the field of direct taxation’.8 The statement was interpreted as indicating a limited scope of application of the 
principle within the field of non-harmonised direct taxation,9 and even confirming the non-existence of an EU 
general anti-avoidance principle insofar as non-harmonised taxes were concerned.10 Although such interpretations 
may have been too restrictive, and the decision did not deny the existence of the principle of prohibition of abuse 
of law, it is undoubtedly true that it did lend argument to the claim that the principle did not display the characteristics 
of a general principle of EU law.  Yet, if this was indeed the Court’s intention, it is argued that this decision has now 
been reversed. 
The first indication that this was in fact the case came in 2014, in Italmoda, a case concerning VAT fraud. In it the 
Court asserted that ‘express authorisation cannot be required in order for the national authorities and courts to be 
able to refuse a benefit under the common system of VAT’.11 A few years later, the decision in Cussens and Others, 
also concerning VAT, confirms the Court’s view on the matter, expressly stating that ‘the principle that abusive 
practices are prohibited may be relied on … even in the absence of provisions of national law’. 12  As the Court 
indicated in that judgment, this characteristic of the principle entails more than interpretation; it implies direct 
applicability, which is a feature of general, rather than interpretative, principles.  A year later, in N Luxembourg 1 
and Others, a decision on a group of cases concerning the compatibility of Danish law with the Interest and Royalty 
Directive, the Court – expressly invoking the judgement in Italmoda – stated that ‘even if it were to transpire, in the 
main proceedings, that national law does not contain rules…Member States must, therefore, refuse to grant the 
advantage resulting from [the Directive], in accordance with the general principle that abusive practices are 
prohibited’.13 
Beyond attributing to the principle of prohibition of abuse of law characteristics that are inherent to general 
principles of EU law, the judgments in Cussens and Others and in the Danish cases, together with other recent 
ones, are also noteworthy for their wording. In Cussens and Others the Court confirmed that the principle ‘displays 
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the general, comprehensive character which is naturally inherent in general principles of EU law’;14 and in N 
Luxembourg 1 and Others it further by stating that ‘it is settled case-law that there is, in EU law, a general legal 
principle that EU law cannot be relied on for abusive or fraudulent ends”.15  Similar wording has been recently used 
by the Court in T Danmark,16 and in Argenta Spaarbank the Court referred to the Special Anti-Avoidance Rule 
(SAAR) in the Parent-Subsidiary Directive as a reflection of ‘the general EU law principle that abuse of rights is 
prohibited’.17  These decisions were not the first occasions in which the Court characterised the principle as a 
general principle of EU law – indeed it had done so already in Kofoed.18  It is also true that relying solely on the 
terminology used by the Court would amount to a strictly formalist approach, which is difficult to justify in the context 
of previous terminological confusions in this area. Whilst relevant, therefore, the wording used by the Court cannot 
be the sole determining factor in the characterisation of this principle as a general one,19 and indeed such 
designations of the CJEU have in the past been questioned.20  Yet, as discussed below, it is argued that these 
decisions have finally settled the debate that has been raging since the decision in Halifax, on the true nature of 
the principle of prohibition of abuse of law as a general principle of EU law. 
General vs Interpretative Principle 
Although there is no full doctrinal agreement on what constitutes a general principle of EU law,21 the main 
characteristics usually attributed to them, namely generality, weight, and non-conclusiveness, are all present in the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU regarding the principle of prohibition of abuse of law.22 Beyond these key characteristics, 
however, there are several other factors that confirm the principle, as it stands today – after in particular the 
decisions in Cussens and Others and the Danish cases – as general, rather than merely interpretative. 
First, as it has been argued,23 the conceptualisation of the principle of prohibition of abuse of law as interpretative 
ignores the second element of the abuse of law test – which many have sought to argue, in cases such as Weald 
Leasing, is its main element – namely artificiality, under which the principal aim of the transaction is to obtain an 
advantage.  A finding that the application of the rule in question is contrary to its purpose is not regarded as 
sufficient; the reliance of those invoking the rule must be abusive – this is more than reading down the relevant 
rule through interpretation.  This reality was acknowledged by Advocate General Mazak in RBS Holdings, who 
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stated that interpreting a provision of EU law and establishing an abusive practice were ‘conceptually distinct and 
should accordingly be dealt with one after the other’.24 
Second, the principle has been used by the CJEU on various occasions as an instrument of judicial review of 
national legal provisions. It was arguably in that capacity that the principle was applied in Cadbury Schweppes and 
other direct taxation cases regarding non-harmonised areas: in these cases the principle of prohibition of abuse of 
law does not influence the interpretation of the scope of the freedom of establishment, which is deemed to apply, 
but on the contrary, it is used as a stand-alone exception to the applicable free movement right; this then resulted 
in the disapplication of the national provisions, as per the principle of supremacy of EU law, not in an interpretation 
of the national provision in conformity with EU, as per the principle of indirect effect. 
Third, it is now clear that the principle applies in the absence of national legislation to the same effect.  Arguably, 
it was this characteristic that sparked the various preliminary references to the Court coming from the UK courts, 
following the decision in Emsland-Stärke: it is hardly coincidental that these cases emerged from the UK, which 
lacked at that time a general anti-avoidance, or anti-abuse provision; it rather reflects the willingness of HMRC to 
invoke what was then known as the abuse of rights doctrine against VAT avoidance schemes, in the absence of 
national legislation to that effect.  It does not result necessarily from either the statement in Kofoed – according to 
which, in the absence of the transposition of a specific anti-avoidance provision in Merger Directive, the principle 
should not substitute it – or that in 3M Italia – according to which there is no obligation upon the Member States to 
combat abusive practices in the field of direct taxation – that the principle does not apply in the absence of national 
legislation.  Yet, to the extent that it could have been interpreted in that manner, as discussed above, the decision 
has now been reversed in Italmoda, Cussens and Others, N Luxembourg 1, and T Danmark.25 
Finally, whilst the terminology used within CJEU is still not uniform, it is noteworthy that there are now several – 
and growing – number of statements confirming the nature of the principle of prohibition of abuse of law as a 
general principle of EU law, not only made by several Advocates General, but also by the Court itself, the most 
recent of which in Cussens and Others, Argenta Spaarbank,26 N Luxembourg 1,27 and T Danmark.28  Indeed a 
brief analysis of the various statements on the general vs interpretative nature of the principle of prohibition of 
abuse of law, as summarised in Table 1 below, highlights the fact that not since 1998 has an Advocate General 
expressly supported the characterisation of the principle as interpretative – although in 2004 the Advocate General 
in Chen did express some reservations as to its characterisation as general;29 on the contrary, not only there have 
been multiple references to the principle as a general principle of EU law, but these have grown in intensity since 
the decision in Halifax.  In this regard, it is also significant to note that, as it is acknowledged within the EU 
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constitutional law doctrine, one of the most significant roles of Advocates General has been their contribution to 
the development of general principles of EU law.30 
Table 1: CJEU References to Nature of EU Principle of Prohibition of Abuse of Law 
GENERAL PRINCIPLE INTERPRETATIVE PRINCIPLE 
Centros (Advocate-General La Pergola), 1999 
Diamantis (Advocate-General Saggio), 2000 
Halifax (Advocate-General Maduro), 2006 
Kofoed, 2007 
Bozkurt (Advocate-General Sharpston), 2010 
Oberto and O’Leary (Advocate-General Mengozzi), 2014 
CASTA and Others, 2016 
Cussens and Others, 2017 
Argenta Spaarbank, 2017 
N Luxembourg 1, 2018 
T Danmark, 2019 
Kefalas (Advocate-General Tesauro), 1998 
Chen (Advocate General Tizzano), 2004 
 
Over the last decade various arguments have been presented against the characterisation of the principle of 
prohibition of abuse of law as a general principle of EU law.  Most of these have now been expressly addressed 
by the jurisprudence of the CJEU,31 but two arguments are arguably still relevant, and thus merit closer scrutiny.  
The first is that the principle is inconsistently applied by the Court, and that this lack of uniform application somehow 
prevents its characterisation as a general principle of EU law.32  The answer to this argument, however, is that 
uniformity of application is not a fundamental characteristic of general principles, due to their inherent structural 
generality and scope-related generality.33  It is not surprising therefore that, as mentioned above, the intensity and 
the scope of application of a general principle may vary depending on the subject matter, and that this is a 
phenomenon present as regards other (uncontested) general principles of EU law, such as the principle of 
proportionality.34 
The second argument is that characterising the prohibition of abuse of law as a general principle carries significant 
risks of undermining the general principle of legal certainty.35  The characterisation as a general principle does 
                                                          
30 N Burrows and R Greaves, The Advocate General and EC Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) 7; and T Tridimas, 
‘The role of the Advocate General in the development of Community Law: Some reflections’ (1997) 34 Common Market Law 
Review 1349, 1386. 
31 R. de la Feria, fn. 3, at 436-37. 
32 N. Brown, ‘Is there a general principle of abuse of rights in European Community Law?’, in Heukel and D Curtin (eds), 
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33 C. Semmelmann, ‘General Principles in EU Law between a Compensatory Role and an Intrinsic Value’ (2013) 19 European 
Law Journal 457, 461. 
34 T. Harbo, ‘The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law’ (2010) 16 European Law Journal 158. 
35 A. Arnull, ‘What is a General Principle of EU Law?’ in R. de la Feria and S. Vogenauer, fn. 2, ch 2, at 22-23. 
indeed carry risks to legal certainty, as expressly acknowledged by Advocate General Maduro in Halifax,36 which 
should not be underestimated. The principle of legal certainty is inherent to any legal system and in essence 
requires that the application of the law to a specific situation must be predictable.37  Within the EU context, the 
principle was first invoked by the CJEU in 1961,38 has long been recognised as general principle of EU law,39 and 
it often features in the case law of the CJEU, with reportedly over 2,500 decisions of the Court making express 
reference to it.40  Despite its notorious ambiguity and vagueness,41 it is said to encompass several other principles, 
and in particular the principle of legitimate expectations, which requires that those who act reasonably and in good 
faith on the basis of the law should not see those expectations defrauded.42 
The contra-argument to the contention that the principle of prohibition of abuse of law should not be characterised 
as a general principle of EU law because it undermines legal certainty is two-fold.  Firstly, acknowledging the risks 
which characterising the principle of prohibition of abuse of law as a general principle of EU law, does not – indeed 
cannot – equate to denying its existence; disagreeing with a specific legal development, cannot mean denying that 
the development ever took place.  Secondly, the principle of prohibition of abuse of law must be balanced against 
other principles, and vice-versa, other principles must be balanced against the principle of prohibition of abuse of 
law; indeed conflicts between two or more general principles is not uncommon, and a balance must always be 
achieved between different principles that ‘form part of the Community legal system’.43 Despite its status as a 
general principle of EU law, the principle of legal certainty is not absolute and should not be safeguarded at all 
costs, but rather outweighed by other legal principles.44  As demonstrated by the CJEU case-law, often resource 
to other general principles will undermine legal certainty:45 paradigmatic examples of this phenomenon would be 
cases involving the general EU principle of proportionality,46 or the general principle of the general EU principle of 
equal treatment.47 
It is therefore in this context that the discussion as regards the risks to legal certainty presented by the EU principle 
of prohibition of abuse of law should be held. Those risks are often raised in the context of general anti-avoidance 
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37 J. Raitio, fn 20, at 52. 
38 Case 42/59, SNUPAT, ECLI:EU:C:1961:5. 
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201/08, Plantanol, ECLI:EU:C:2009:539; C-72/10, Costa, EU:C:2012:80. 
40 J. Van Meerbeeck, ‘The principle of legal certainty in the case-law of the European Court of Justice: from certainty to trust’ 
(2016) 41 European Law Review 275. 
41 ibid. 
42 J. Raitio, fn. 20, at 54. 
43 Case C-255/02, ECLI:EU:C:2005:200, para 84. 
44 J. Raitio, fn. 20, at 58. 
45 On the balancing of the principle of legal certainty with that of legality, for example, see X. Groussot and T. Minssen, ‘Res 
judicata in the Court of Justice case-law: balancing legal certainty with legality?’ (2007) 3 European Constitutional Law Review 
385. 
46 T. Lyons, ‘State Aid, Taxation and Abuse of Law’ in R. de la Feria and S. Vogenauer, fn. 2, at 508. 
47 Joined cases C-402/07 and C-432/07, Air France, ECLI:EU:C:2009:716; and C-581/10 and C-629/10, Deutsche Lufthansa 
and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2012:657. 
mechanisms;48 however, as it has been argued, these principles ‘cut(s) across an immemorial debate between two 
legitimate objectives of any legal order: legal certainty (the tendency to yield predictable legal outcomes) and legal 
congruence (the tendency to yield equitable legal outcomes)’;49 or said in a different way, the principle of prohibition 
of abuse of law should be set in the context of the wider debate over security versus justice.  Blind respect for legal 
certainty and the rigid respect of the letter of the law will lead to inequity, and jeopardise what has been designated 
as ‘legal congruence’.50  This is particular true in the context of EU law, not least since hard law is often difficult to 
approve, so that reliance on judicial discretion in its application is particular necessary in the context of changing 
realities. 51 
All the above leads to the inescapable conclusion that it is now settled case law that the principle of prohibition of 
abuse of law is a general principle of EU law, rather than an interpretative one, with all the legal consequences 
which being characterised as such entails.  In particular, it follows that the new General Anti Avoidance Rule 
(GAAR), as set out in Article 6 of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive,52 must be seen merely as a partial codification 
of this general principle, as applied to taxation.  This codification is natural – demonstrated by the fact that, despite 
key differences, there are clear parallels between the EU process, and that witnessed in other jurisdictions – and 
it can be helpful, creating in effect an hierarchy of EU anti-avoidance rules.53  Yet, this does not take away from 
the magnitude of this development: it represents the culmination of a process that, arguably, started many decades 
ago. Like many other things in our lives at present, a new normal to which we all must adapt. 
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